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The volume under review publishes the proceedings of  a colloquium held at the University of  
Paris in July 2010. The aim of  this colloquium was to fill a lacuna that characterizes the contem-
porary francophone international legal scholarship. Indeed, as noted by the editors in their fore-
word to the book, after a prolific period during the 1970s and 1980s, French and francophone 
scholars have gradually lost interest in Third World-related issues and ignored this topic in their 
research and teachings.1 This trend is regrettable and unfortunate because despite some pro-
gress and improvements, international relations are still marked by significant inequalities and 
disparities between rich and poor countries, while several regions of  the world remain in a situ-
ation of  extreme poverty. Therefore, there is an urgent need to renew and revive the reflection of  
French-speaking international lawyers on their discipline by inciting them to critically question 
the present existence and effects of  the rules of  international law relating to the Third World 
in the current globalized context. To achieve this goal, Mark Toufayan, Emmanuelle Tourme-
Jouannet and Hélène Ruiz Fabri had the idea of  bringing together, in Paris, francophone and 
anglophone scholars and prominent representatives of  the critical Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL). TWAIL scholars were invited to expose their ideas and thoughts, 
and their French-speaking counterparts were asked to react and comment on these thoughts.
The book under review collects the contributions in French or English of  the scholars who 
participated in this debate. It is divided into five main chapters. The first chapter consists of  
a general introduction to TWAIL written by Bhudinper Chimni, while the four others deal 
respect ively with the following topics: the reinterpretation of  the history of  international law, 
the adoption of  a new approach to human rights, the Third World and development, and, 
finally, the rethinking of  the modes of  diffusion of  international law and teaching methods. In 
line with the editors’ intent to generate a debate on TWAIL, each chapter has the same struc-
ture, namely one or two essays written by prominent representatives of  this current debate, 
which are followed by commentaries formulated either by francophone scholars or by anglo-
phone authors who do not define themselves as members of  TWAIL but who have shown a 
peculiar interest in the question of  the impact of  international law on Third World countries 
and populations in their writings.
It would be unfair to consider the latter to be mere commentaries. Indeed, a large number of  
the published essays constitute enriching, insightful, comprehensive and well-documented stud-
ies that go far beyond the scope of  simple reactions and observations to the thoughts exposed by 
the TWAIL authors. Nevertheless, for the sake of  clarity and knowing that this volume is con-
ceived by its editors as a debate on TWAIL’s thoughts and ideas, the various commentaries can 
be classified into two categories even though this classification does not give full and fair account 
of  the quality, complexity, and originality of  their content.
The first category comprises the contributions of  authors who decided to endorse the ideas 
and thoughts exposed by the representatives of  TWAIL and to further develop these thoughts 
by providing the readership with additional elements, examples and arguments in support of  
the position advocated by this critical group. In the second chapter of  the volume under review, 
Antony Anghie, one of  the leading TWAIL scholars argues that the historical evolution of  
1 One of  the more recent initiatives from the Francophone world comes from Emmanuelle Tourme-
Jouannet through the Global Justice/Injustice Project. For more information on this project, see Justice 
Globale, available at https://justiceglobale.wordpress.com (last visited 7 August 2015).
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international law shows that it has always served as a vehicle for colonialism and imperialism.2 
To support his view, Anghie draws upon several examples related to different decisive steps of  
the expansion of  international law. He explains how the acknowledgment of  the humanity of  
Indians of  the New World by Francisco de Vittoria had paradoxically led to a legitimization of  
the Spanish colonization, since it resulted in the application of  a supposedly universal natural 
law to the Indian peoples that was in reality derived from the European identity and view of  the 
world. Indeed, the Indians’ cultural practices and way of  life were considered to be inconsistent 
with this natural law, and the Spanish government over the American territories was proposed 
as a remedy to this unlawful situation.
According to Anghie, a similar dynamic of  intertwining between international law and 
colonialism can be observed in the 19th century. At that time, the test of  civilization accord-
ing to which sovereignty was conferred or refused to non-European societies was exclusively 
based on European standards of  life and government. Moreover, in the cases where native chiefs 
were granted legal personality by international lawyers, it was done for the unique purpose of  
enabling them to enter into treaties that provided for a transfer of  sovereignty to a European 
power. Moving on to the decolonization process, Anghie argues that the acquisition of  sover-
eignty by Third World states served as a legal basis to bind them to prior international economic 
law rules to which they had not consented. These rules contributed to the perpetuation of  the 
economic dependence and subordination of  the newly independent states to the former colonial 
powers.
Finally, turning to the present period, the author contends that international law remains an 
instrument of  imperialism. According to him, the demands of  internal reforms imposed on Third 
World countries through the conditionality of  international financial institutions (IFIs) can be 
compared with the system of  capitulations that had previously been used by European states to 
demand the reform of  non-European states. Furthermore, the current ‘war on terror’, which 
has justified the military occupation and administration of  a number of  Third World states, 
recalls the concept of  a ‘civilizing mission’ that was developed in the context of  the League of  
Nations. In sum, for Anghie, since its Vittorian beginnings until the present time, international 
law has always been animated by the project of  governing and transforming the peoples of  the 
non-European world.
In his commentary on Anghie’s article, Ki-Gab Park from the Max Planck Institute for 
International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law in Luxembourg affirms that he shares 
the thoughts expressed by the author. He also adds that by relying, in the name of  the theory of  
inter-temporal law, on treaties and practices of  the former colonial powers to solve the disputes 
between states born out of  decolonization, the International Court of  Justice (ICJ) is somewhat 
contributing to the perpetuation of  imperialism.
In the third chapter, which deals with TWAIL’s approach to human rights, Vasuki Nesiah, 
another prominent figure in this critical school of  thought, explains how the recourse to human 
rights may sometimes entail significant perverse effects. Drawing upon the transitional justice 
processes that took place in Chile and South Africa, she argues that the human rights’ tech-
nicalities operated in these two countries were used as mechanisms of  exclusion. Indeed, the 
convictions were limited to the crimes that constituted physical assaults (murder, torture, rape, 
and so on), while the claims of  victims of  the macro-economic policy of  Pinochet and the daily 
racist abuses and humiliations of  the apartheid system were ignored. In the conclusion of  her 
contribution, Nesiah adds that the situation of  violence in some failing Third World countries, 
which are generally accompanied by serious violations of  human rights, have the effect of  
2 These ideas were developed in A.  Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of  International Law 
(2007).
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turning these states into political terra nullius, where external interventions are considered to 
be legitimate.
In his contribution to the fourth chapter of  the present volume, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, 
another prominent TWAIL scholar, echoes the last idea exposed by Vasuki Nesiah as he argues 
that the human rights discourse is of  a hegemonic nature because it is often used to legitimize 
hegemonic military interventions. According to him, the same can be said of  the discourse on 
development, which contributes to the legitimization of  the liberal commercial policy promoted 
by the World Trade Organization and the institutional reforms imposed on developing coun-
tries by IFIs. Therefore, in order to achieve their objective of  a ‘counter-hegemonic international 
law’, Third World countries should find alternative strategies to the human rights and devel-
opment discourses on which they are currently relying and which have proven to be ineffec-
tive and counter-productive. Among the alternatives proposed by Rajagopal in the conclusion 
of  his study are the growth of  regional international law, which provides a counter-balance 
to the hegemonic international law; the replacement of  the current multilateral system with 
an alliance of  hegemonic powers from the North and the South, acting in concert; the emer-
gence of  a new front of  Third World states; the emergence of  coalitions of  small and poor states 
with social movements and the development of  a critique of  the fetishism of  institutions at the 
international level.
Several commentators have expressed their agreement with the ideas and thoughts of  Vasuki 
Nesiah and Balakrishnan Rajagopal and have undertaken to further develop some aspects of  
the arguments that were exposed. In her commentary on Nesiah’s contribution, Vera Gowland-
Debbas argues that as in the context of  transitional justice, international human rights law also 
operates as a mechanism of  exclusion in the field of  refugees’ protection. She shows how by link-
ing the definition of  the term ‘refugee’ to the notion of  persecution, international law rules pro-
vide European states with an authoritative tool, allowing them to reject the demands of  certain 
categories of  asylum seekers on the basis of  their origins, thereby undermining the universal 
character of  human rights. Similarly, in her contribution to the third chapter of  the book under 
review, Ratna Kapur highlights the limitations of  the development of  women’s rights at the 
international level. She explains that the co-optation of  feminist concerns within international 
human rights law through the adoption of  the UN Security Council resolutions has had the 
effect of  excluding certain categories of  women from the protection of  the law. Indeed, accord-
ing to Kapur, this co-optation has been carried out on the basis of  a victim-centred approach 
that is limited to armed conflict contexts. Therefore, in post-conflict situations, such as the 
one in Nepal in the aftermath of  the ‘People’s War’, the female ex-combatants of  the People’s 
Liberation Army who could not be considered to be victims had no other choices but to return to 
their homes where they are expected to go back to the traditional female role that they hoped to 
change through the insurgency.
Mohamed Mahmoud Mohamed Salah shares the idea advocated by Rajagopal of  using devel-
opment discourse as an instrument of  hegemony and domination. In his study, which has been 
included in the third chapter, he underlines the fact that the concepts of  ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ and ‘right to development’ lack normative content. Therefore, their impact at the legal 
level, notably their application by international courts, and their effect on the reality on the 
ground, is quasi-inexistent, which turns them into mere elements of  language that are aimed 
at legitimizing the actions of  IFIs. Interestingly, Mohamed Salah compares this reference to the 
development in the international legal discourse to the semantic shift lately operated by the IFIs. 
This shift has consisted of  replacing the reference to ‘structural adjustments programs’ with the 
reference to ‘poverty reduction strategies’, while the policy of  imposing reforms to Third World 
countries in the economical interest of  Western countries remains unchanged.
The fifth chapter of  the book under review is dedicated to rethinking the modes of  diffusion, 
research and teaching of  international law in light of  the reflections of  the TWAILers on their 
Book Reviews 783
discipline. In her contribution to this chapter, Karin Mickelson underlines the necessity of  teach-
ing TWAIL’s theories in undergraduate, professional and graduate programs due to the import-
ance of  enabling students to confront the hypocrisies and inconsistencies of  international law. 
Her essay is followed by the contribution of  James Thuo Gathii, who presents TWAIL as a decen-
tralized network of  scholars sharing common concerns about the Third World, which is char-
acterized by its openness to a variety of  approaches (critical, feminist, post-colonial, modernist, 
Marxist and so on) and by its lack of  any structure of  hierarchy and authority. This contribution 
ends with an exhaustive bibliography of  TWAIL scholarship, which is of  great interest for inter-
national law scholars, students and researchers interested in furthering their knowledge of  the 
theories of  this school of  thought.
Both Mickelson and Gathii also address one of  the main criticisms levelled against the 
TWAILers, namely the nihilism of  their works and thoughts. Indeed, as critical approaches 
to international law, TWAIL is often accused of  engaging in critique for the sake of  critique, 
destroying the existing edifice without presenting alternatives to replace it. However, for Gathii, 
this accusation is misleading. Relying on the works of  feminist TWAILers, he shows how the 
writings of  TWAIL scholars are usually accompanied by action and normative reform propos-
als aimed at promoting justice and equality in international relations. Mickelson highlights 
the fact that TWAILers are driven by their hope and faith in the transformative potential of  
international law. Therefore, they cannot easily be accused of  nihilism since their critique is 
motivated by the will to transform international law and not by any kind of  complacency or 
pleasure derived from deriding the system. Hence, TWAIL scholarship is useful, and its expan-
sion through teaching necessary in that it could boost the transformative potential of  interna-
tional law by pointing out its flaws and shortcomings.
In a short but insightful contribution in the concluding part of  the book, ICJ Judge Mohamed 
Bennouna also links the usefulness of  the TWAIL scholarship to the transformative potential of  
international law. He argues that when the application of  a rule of  international law leads to 
patently unfair solutions, the rule in question is often subsequently modified in order to meet the 
requirements of  justice and equity. To illustrate his assertion, Judge Bennouna gives the example 
of  the evolution of  the jus standi rule in the jurisprudence of  the ICJ. He shows how, as a result 
of  the criticisms charged against the Court’s judgment of  1966 in the South West Africa case, 
which had limited the right of  standing of  states to the defence of  their subjective interests, the 
ICJ recognized, in its 1970 judgment in the Barcelona Traction case, the existence of  erga omnes 
international law obligations, which allow states to institute proceedings in the interest of  the 
international community as a whole.3
The necessity of  teaching TWAIL as part of  law curriculums is endorsed by Eleftheria Neframi 
in her commentary on the texts of  Mickelson and Gathii. Interestingly, Neframi argues that 
TWAILers’ thoughts and theories should also be taken into account in the teaching of  the law 
of  the European Union (EU). According to her, the institutional rules that regulate the external 
action of  the EU are driven by the objective of  turning it into a prominent global actor. However, 
this goal cannot be reached if  the EU is not accepted and recognized as such by its Third World 
partners. Therefore, since the TWAILers express the concerns and aspirations of  Third World 
countries and peoples, their thoughts and ideas may be helpful to redefine and clarify the 
European law rules applicable to the relations of  assistance and cooperation between the EU and 
southern countries.
3 Legal Consequences for States of  the Continued Presence of  South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports (1971) 12; Case Concerning the Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application, 1962)  (Belgium v.  Spain), ICJ Pleadings 
(1962), vol. IX, 507.
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Unlike the scholars whose contributions and commentaries are mentioned and briefly sum-
marized above, a second category of  contributors to the volume under review has adopted a 
less laudatory and more critical position vis-à-vis the ideas and thoughts exposed by the rep-
resentatives of  TWAIL. The critiques levelled by these commentators either concern specific 
arguments exposed in a peculiar contribution to the book or go beyond the commented article 
to address one of  the general characteristics of  TWAIL. For instance, in his commentary on 
Anghie’s text, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, who is one of  the leading francophone figures of  
the first generation of  Third World international lawyers, considers that the view advocated 
by the author of  an intrinsically colonial and imperialistic international law is too reductive. 
For him, contrary to Anghie’s contention, international law was not created for the unique 
purpose of  legitimizing colonialism and regulating the relations between European states and 
non-European peoples. He explains that international law has always been meant to govern 
inter-state relations and that its scope was expanded to colonial questions in order to regulate 
the competition between the European colonial powers. Turning to the present and the possible 
future of  the discipline, Judge Bedjaoui argues that international law reflects the balance of  
power within the international political order. Therefore, he believes that the current transition 
towards a ‘multi-polar’ world will result in the emergence of  an international law freed from its 
imperialistic and hegemonic aspects.
In what seems to be an indirect and rather hidden critique of  the TWAIL scholarship, sev-
eral contributors to the volume under review have questioned the notion of  ‘Third World’ 
and the relevance of  opposing Northern and Southern or developed and developing coun-
tries in today’s international context. For example, in his commentary on Rajagopal’s text, 
Rahim Kherad underlines the appropriateness of  the notion of  ‘Fourth World’ proposed by 
Father Joseph Wresinski, which includes not only the countries known as the Third World but 
also some under-developed and poor regions located in industrialized and developed coun-
tries. In the same vein, Jean Salmon explains that the main issues addressed by TWAIL, such 
as the protection of  the environment and the fight against poverty, are not unique to Third 
World countries. According to him, these are universal problems caused by globalization and 
liberalism.
The unity and homogeneity of  the Third World have also been called into question. For 
instance, Kherad argues that Third World countries are today fragmented into three categories, 
namely the least developed, the developing and the newly industrialized countries. Drawing 
upon the example of  the purchase and leasing of  agricultural lands in Africa by emerging 
countries such as China and its dramatic consequences on local populations, Kherad demon-
strates that the neo-colonial and imperialistic attitude criticized by TWAIL is no longer unique 
to Northern countries. It can also be adopted by states formally belonging to the Third World 
bloc. This view is echoed by Jean Marc Sorel, who argues that the rebalancing of  the interna-
tional political order is being realized through the emergence of  new imperialisms such as the 
Chinese one.
The TWAIL approaches to human rights and development are also subject to criticism. In a very 
rich and informative essay in the concluding part of  the book, Rémi Bachand blames the TWAILers 
for their lack of  an in-depth analysis of  political economy, in general, and of  the functioning of  
capitalism, in particular. He explains how this lacuna impairs the quality, comprehensiveness and 
radicalism of  their critique of  international law rules. For instance, Bachand notes that if  TWAIL 
scholars stress the political ‘instrumentalization’ of  human rights by imperialistic powers, they fail 
to mention that the characteristic of  human rights is not to abolish the structures of  domination 
and exploitation but only to mitigate their adverse effects in a way that is acceptable to those who 
benefit from the system. To substantiate his argument, the author gives the example of  the rules 
prohibiting forced labour and underlines their illusory nature by explaining that since capitalism 
separates the workers from the means of  production, the former do not have any choice but to sell 
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their labour force to capitalists and accept the working conditions imposed on them. In addition, 
Bachand underlines the relevance of  the Marxist theory of  the tendency of  the rate of  profit to 
fall for the analysis and comprehension of  international law rules. He explains that a substantial 
number of  the norms of  international law that are detrimental to Third World countries, such as 
the rules relating to the ‘conditionalities’ of  IFIs, international trade, the protection of  international 
investments and the regulation of  the use of  force, can be analysed as instruments established by 
Western countries in order to counter the earlier-mentioned tendency, which has been caused by 
the over-accumulation of  capital in their territory. In sum, Bachand argues that in order to achieve 
their objectives, TWAIL should rely more on classical and modern critical economic literature.
Finally, in the fifth and last chapter of  the volume under review, which deals with the modes of  dif-
fusion and teaching of  TWAIL, some contributors question the appropriateness of  including courses, 
seminars and master programmes that are exclusively dedicated to TWAIL in law curriculums. For 
Jean Salmon, this teaching strategy is not feasible for financial reasons due to the lack of  attractive 
professional opportunities offered by such formation and the unwillingness of  private companies to 
fund research projects aimed at denouncing the current liberal economic system. Instead, Salmon 
proposes to discuss the ideas and thoughts of  TWAIL within the framework of  classical interna-
tional law courses (international environment law, human rights law, EU law and so on), thereby 
inviting international law professors to adopt a teaching method that combines critical and positiv-
ist approaches to the discipline. Salmon’s position is echoed by Olivier Corten, who argues that the 
incorporation of  courses on TWAIL in academic law programmes entails the risk of  confining their 
theories to the courses in question. Drawing upon the experience of  francophone law faculties, he 
explains that the creation of  such courses usually lead law professors to stick to a positivist approach 
in their teachings and to use as an excuse the existence of  other courses dedicated to critical theories.
In addition to these reflections on teaching, Corten’s commentary contains a critical appraisal of  
TWAIL’s legal methodology. Indeed, Corten starts his article by arguing that TWAIL is neither origi-
nal nor innovative. He explains that its methodology is similar to the sociology of  law tradition (la 
sociologie du droit) in that it consists of  placing international law rules in their social, political and 
historical context and understanding the rationale of  their emergence at a specific point in history. 
Moreover, he adds that since they describe international law as a product of  the will of  the ruling 
class, namely the colonial and imperialistic states, and as a tool used to perpetuate the domination of  
this ruling class over the Third World, TWAIL can be considered to be a neo-Marxist current. Corten 
then argues that TWAIL’s objectives can effectively be pursued through a traditional formalist meth-
odology without the need of  adopting a critical posture. For instance, he demonstrates how certain 
legal interpretations advocated by Western states, such as the one that confers a decisive weight to 
the practice of  the so-called major states in the establishment of  customary rules or those aimed at 
asserting the legality of  the war on terror, can be easily challenged on the basis of  positivist legal 
concepts and reasoning (sovereign equality of  states, ICJ jurisprudence, UN Charter rules and so on).
In summary, two general conclusions can be drawn from the debate and exchange of  ideas 
described above between anglophone TWAILers and francophone international law scholars. 
First, despite some criticisms expressed with regard to the methodological posture of  TWAIL, it 
is clear that there is a quasi-consensus among the different contributors to the volume under 
review on the importance and the usefulness of  the existence of  a critical legal approach aimed 
at analysing the impact of  international law rules on Third World peoples and countries. Indeed, 
several scholars, including Francisco Meledje, who authored the concluding article of  the book, 
assert that it is the ethical responsibility of  international law scholars to shed light on the rules 
that contribute to the perpetuation of  poverty and violations of  human dignity in the Third 
World. Moreover, many other commentators underlined the political potential of  TWAIL as a 
means of  inducing a transformation of  international law into a just and non-hegemonic legal 
order. As for the second conclusion, it emerges from the debate that TWAIL objectives (more 
equality, more diversity, more democracy and more representativeness in the international legal 
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system) might be better furthered by formalist and positivist approaches that allow international 
scholars to defend the interests of  the Third World from within the current system.
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